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A recent Iowa Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) report found that Iowa’s 
ethanol industry created 46,937 jobs and $7.315 billion in state product.
1  It 
would be wonderful if this apparently booming industry really created all 
those jobs and accounted for such a huge fraction of state economic product, 
but it did not.    
 
This report evaluates portions of the RFA report regarding job growth and 
domestic product effects concerning ethanol industry operations in Iowa – 
the claim of 46,937 created jobs.  It shows that the overall net gains in 
economic activity in Iowa are much lower than reported in that study.  This 
review first looks at the operational estimates and then separately the 
assumptions used for the construction effects.   
 
Local, state, and national public policies, incentives, and subsidies are 
currently allocated based on an expectation of net gains to regional fortunes.  
The RFA study and others like it entice conclusions about the economic gains 
to regions that are unwarranted, however.  There is confusion about, if not 
an odd fusion of, statistics that are used for promotion and statistics that are 
used to justify sound public decision making.  If public resources are 
allocated on the basis of misleading or exaggerated expectations of economic 
gain that will not materialize, then public resources will have been 
squandered and the competing alternative uses to which those public 
resources could have been put will have been thwarted. 
 
Here is the gap in estimates:  Our sponsored research at Iowa State 
University leads us to conclude that, on the plant operation side only and 
considering all relevant likely economic impacts, there was the equivalent of 
28 ethanol plants in 2006 that processed at least 600 million bushels of corn.  
We estimated that those plants produced 1.62 billion gallons of ethanol, and 
in so doing required 1,100 jobs at the ethanol plants leading ultimately to a 
total bump of from 4,100 to 4,700 jobs in the whole Iowa economy.  The 
accompanying table contains those estimates.   
 
                                                 
* The author is an associate scientist in economics at ISU.  This report is based in large part on 
research funded by the Kellogg Foundation and the Bio-economy Working Group at Iowa State 
University. 
1 Urbanchuck, John.  Contribution of the Biofuels Indsutry to the Economy of Iowa.  Prepared 
for the Iowa Renewable Fuels Association.  February, 2007.  That study combines both ethanol 
and soy-diesel in its analysis.  This review only addresses the ethanol side of that report. 




600  million 
bushels (2006)
Plants 28
Jobs at the plants 1,100
Total jobs (including 
plant jobs)  4,100 to 4,700
Ethanol production 
(million gallons)               1,620 




The Iowa RFA report indicates that there were 27,025 jobs in 2006 in the 
ethanol production side of this process (excluding construction jobs); over 
22,300 more than we estimate.   The gap between the two estimates, just on 
the ethanol operations side, is immense.   The next sections explain the 
difference. 
 
1.  Deconstructing the operational estimates: understanding final 
demand multipliers 
 
The Iowa Renewable Fuels Association research was conducted using sets of 
final demand, RIMS II, multipliers generated at the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  Final demand means that either the industry is producing for final 
consumption by households and institutions within the region or it is 
producing for consumption by entities external to the region of production.  It 
is safe to assume here that the vast majority of new ethanol production in 
Iowa is geared towards export sales.  On the surface, then, the use of a final 
demand multiplier would seem to make sense. 
 
The initial assumption in the use of a final demand multiplier and its 
interpretation, however, is that expansion in industrial production like 
ethanol creates, concomitantly and at a fixed rate, expansion in all inter-
industrial relations that industry has with its suppliers.  So, the use of a final 
demand multiplier for a particular industry, like the organic chemical 
industry
2 assumes that as that industry expands production, there are fixed-
ratio expansions in all industries that supply it.  Hence, there is a 
fundamental flaw in the use of the RIMS II multipliers by the study authors in 
                                                 
2 The dry-mill ethanol industry is properly classified as a type of organic chemical 
manufacturing.  As this industry is very new, however, national input-output tables do not 
reflect the production characteristics of modern dry mill plants.  Consequently, this research 
applies multipliers to key inputs into production as a substitute for a reliable organic chemicals 
industry multiplier. 
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the case of corn ethanol production.  They apply it to elements of the 
production process for biofuels that are not contributing to satisfying a 
difference in final demand for that commodity; namely, for corn.    
 
Corn in Iowa historically had three uses: it was sold to industry as an 
intermediate input into production, like feed mills; it was fed to animals, 
again as an intermediate input into livestock production; and it was exported 
to satisfy external demands (or final demand).  By creating ethanol plants in 
Iowa, corn that had gone to export-based final demand is now being 
converted into an intermediate input into ethanol production.  Value is added 
to that input, but the overall nature of the corn input did not change – there 
is no net new contribution of corn production to final demand.   
 
As a consequence, the application of a final demand multiplier to the corn 
sector is spurious.  Those jobs already existed and would have existed had 
there not been an expansion in Iowa ethanol facilities.  The ethanol plant did 
not create the corn production jobs or all of that industry’s up-stream supply 
linkages.  To claim them as ostensibly having been created by the emerging 
ethanol industry is disingenuous and grossly misleading when a full two-
thirds of the “created” ethanol impact jobs were already here. 
 
That leads to our first adjustment: from the 27,205 total jobs attributed to 
Iowa’s ethanol industry operations in the RFA report we subtract the 18,398 
jobs that are linked to the state’s existing corn production sector.  
 
Adjustment 1: 
27,205 initial ethanol job impacts – 18,398 existing corn 
related job impacts = 8,807 jobs 
 
That leaves 8,807 jobs in the Iowa economy that possibly could have been 
created or otherwise stimulated by expansion of ethanol production. 
 
Next we can look at the each of the several other items of inputs into 
production into this industry that are listed by the study authors after the 
already discounted corn values.  First, and very notable, the Iowa ethanol 
industry requires a large amount of natural gas, electricity, and water, 
$452.4 million worth according to the study.  The job gains attributable to 
these three industries combined represent 2,591 of the remaining 8,807 
potential ethanol economic impact jobs.    
 
All three of these, however, are massive, declining cost industries where the 
average cost of delivering their respective commodities up to capacity decline 
sharply.  As a consequence, an industry that is an extremely heavy, and 
therefore easy to supply, user of a particular commodity is delivered that 
commodity at a substantially reduced price to reflect those distributional 
efficiencies.  Large users of utilities do not stimulate average job multiplier 
effects –they stimulate much lower effects.  This is a fundamental flaw in 
RIMS II-type impact analysis and one of the reasons that experienced 
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analysts often conduct fact checks and conduct additional secondary research 
before reporting a statistic.   
 
An analogy of scale economies presents itself readily in the ethanol industry 
itself.  A 50 million gallon per year (MGY) ethanol plant in Iowa requires 35 
jobs.  A 100 MGY per year plant only requires 45 jobs.  The plant increases 
its output by 100 percent, but its job needs only go up by 28.5 percent.  In 
point of fact, basic utilities operate on much greater scale economies than an 
ethanol plant, so one would expect very small job gains in those industries 
due to ethanol plant demands. 
 
As part of the research that we conducted at Iowa State University on the 
potential economic impacts of a biofuels ethanol plant, phone calls were 
made to water, natural gas distributors, and rural electric cooperative 
professionals to ascertain the potential job growth that a large, single 
industry demand of their respective commodities would yield.  In all 
instances, the amount reported by those professionals was a 10
th or less than 
the amount assumed in our modeling systems
3.  Based on that research and 
on fundamental scale economy dynamics it would not be unreasonable or 
uncharitable to assume that the marginal job gains from all new utility 
related activities were no greater than 25 percent of the values reported in 
the table, the lower estimates of the utility professionals notwithstanding.  If 
that were so, we would reduce the utility job impacts to 648 jobs. 
 
Adjustment 2: 
That leaves us with 8,807 – 2,591 + 648 = 6,864 potential jobs 
created by Iowa’s ethanol industry. 
 
Next we need to look at the reasonableness of the transportation 
assumptions creating 1,442 jobs.  Iowa’s corn historically was hauled to a 
mill, to a livestock feeder, or out of state. After processing in an ethanol 
refinery, the amount of weight that must be hauled is substantially the same 
as it had been when the corn was simply exported.
4  We can allow for a 
modicum of new rail capacity, new rail transport needs, and some shifting in 
local transportation, however.  Like the corn statistic at the start of this 
section, we have to conclude that nearly all of the transportation had already 
existed, although we can allow for some transportation shifting.  
Consequently, it might not be unreasonable or uncharitable to allow for a 25 
percent bump in net new transportation demand to the region (considering of 
course a substantial realignment from grain hoppers to ethanol tankers).  
That would lower our 1,442 jobs to 361 net new transportation jobs. 
                                                 
3 Swenson, David and Liesl Eathington. “Determining the Regional Economic Values of Ethanol 
Production in Iowa Considering Different Levels of Local Investment,”  Bioeconomy Working 
Group, College of Agriculture, September 2006  
4 As a rule, out of the original corn weight, a third is ethanol, a third distillers’ grains, and a 
third carbon dioxide.  Reports recently indicate that many plants are venting their carbon 
dioxide as there is a glut of supply regionally so the overall weight is probably less than the 
original corn. 




That leaves us with 6,864 – 1,442 + 361 = 5,782 potential jobs 
created by Iowa’s ethanol industry. 
 
There are several categories of inputs that are incontrovertible and would be 
expected to in fact be new regional indirect industrial demand that was linked 
linearly to ethanol plant operations.  New ethanol plants will require 
substantial maintenance and repair services; they will help to stimulate 
demand for a variety of financial business services, to include banking, 
accounting, insurance, and other important activities; and they do require a 
new schedule of industrial chemical inputs into the production process, 
primarily yeasts, enzymes, and other critical chemicals.  For the time being, 
we can conclude that the assumptions in the report about those inputs and 
their concomitant output multipliers are fairly reasonable. 
 
There is a fundamental question, though, about the likelihood of the bump in 
petroleum refinery inputs that the report claims.  In all, when one looks at a 
modern ethanol plant’s production recipe, one does not identify a set of 
refined petroleum product inputs.  Their energy demands are met 
overwhelmingly by natural gas and electricity.   
 
The organic chemicals industry, the industry that manufactures such diverse 
commodities as acetone to nail polish to tear gas along with dozens of others, 
however, does have strong linkages to refined petroleum products.  The 
assumption that modern Iowa corn ethanol dry mill operation buys $84.4 
million in refined petroleum products as stated in the study is, however, not 
correct.  It is especially dubious because by our separate assessment Iowa’s 
refineries made just $48.7 million in total sales across the whole state of 
Iowa and only needed 13 jobs to make those sales.  It seems quite 
appropriate, then to reject the assertion that 351 refinery related jobs are 
created in Iowa.  
 
Adjustment 4: 
That leaves us with 5,782 – 351 = 5,431 potential jobs created 
by Iowa’s ethanol industry. 
 
This last number is probably a reasonably close estimate of the jobs linked to 
Iowa’s ethanol industry and its other wet corn milling operations, which were 
substantially already in existence in the state and produce a variety of non-
ethanol products like corn sweeteners. 
 
The Renewable Fuels Association report indicated that the operational side of 
ethanol production in Iowa “… support[s] 27,200 jobs (p. 4).)”  After 
deconstructing the author’s procedures and assumptions, however, it is more 
likely that somewhere around 5,431 total jobs in Iowa can be attributed to 
ethanol and other corn processing production for final demand sales. 
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2.  Deconstructing the estimates of gross domestic product 
 
Just on the ethanol production side, the RFA report claims $5,607.3 billion in 
Iowa gross domestic product (or gross state product) from $10.272 billion in 
total output.  The authors assume that, on average, across all industries, 55 
percent of gross sales represent becomes gross domestic product and 45 
percent of gross sales represent all intermediate inputs. 
 
The accompanying table was generated from the 2004 data for the state of 
Iowa that were contained in the ImPlan data base purchased annually and 
maintained by Iowa State University.  That data set is a complete accounting 
of all inter-industrial activity in the state, and it is constructed from data 
supplied in large part from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  It lists 
value added, which is the same statistic as domestic product for an industry.  
It shows that the 55 percent across the board assumption of domestic 
product generation is too high.  The average for all Iowa industries in 2004 
was 49 percent, and the average ranged from a low of 19 percent for total 
retail sales to a high of 67 percent for mining, utilities, and real estate.  The 
average for manufacturing, within which ethanol production is classified, is 
26 percent.  The average from the construction industry is 44 percent.   An 









Transportation & Warehousing 55%
Retail trade 19%
Information 43%
Finance & insurance 58%
Real estate & rental 67%
Professional- scientific & tech svcs 58%
Management of companies 56%
Administrative & waste services 53%
Educational svcs 51%
Health & social services 60%
Arts- entertainment & recreation 61%
Accomodation & food services 44%
Other services 48%
All Industries 49%




Based on this table and on the overstatements in the allocation of jobs listed 
in the previous section, one should also reject the claims of gross domestic 
product contribution listed in the report. 
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3.  Deconstructing the construction effects  
 
Again, just on the ethanol side, the RFA report asserts that 19,733 job 
economic impacts are annually attributable to plant construction in Iowa.  
Out of that they estimate $1.996 billion in state GDP from construction.  The 
authors note that construction jobs are temporary, but yet they infer that 
these values can be annualized and added to the operational statistics and 
reported them as if they were to be considered ongoing.  
 
As a general rule, regional economists never combine a declaration of 
construction effects with operational effects.  They are reported separately 
and discussed separately from operational effects.  There are reasons for that. 
 
For one, many analysts often over-attribute construction activity to a location 
or to a state.  These authors indicate that a third of the overall construction 
value of a modern ethanol plant accumulates to Iowa contractors.  They, 
however, offer no evidence to support that contention.  If we break down a 
modern Iowa ethanol plant we know that the land and the land preparation 
are likely to be purchased or bid locally, along with area ready-mix and 
aggregate production.  Very large fractions of the engineering, architectural, 
specialized contracting, and the highly specialized capital, technical, and 
labor inputs required by modern ethanol plants do not originate in Iowa, 
however.  It remains to be demonstrated that a full third of the capital 
payments for a plant stay in Iowa. 
 
We can look for indirect evidence of construction job growth in Iowa.  In 
analyzing growth in Iowa construction employment over the past 5 years 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (the same agency that supplies 
the RIMS II multipliers), we see that total jobs grew by 12,276 in that sector.  
Three-fourths of those jobs have accumulated in the category of construction 
called “specialty trade construction”, however, which entails primarily 
businesses that pour cement, finish walls, a nd do plumbing, painting, and 
electrical work.  Total commercial building construction jobs in Iowa, the kind 
that would raise an ethanol plant, however, are only up by a little over 1,550 
jobs.  And a spatial assessment of construction job growth in Iowa through 
2004 indicates that the vast majority of growth is associated with commercial 
and residential expansions in several of the state’s booming metropolitan 
regions, not areas where ethanol plants are going up. 
 
In short there is scant evidence of net strong bumps in construction jobs in 
Iowa that are attributable directly to the boost in ethanol plant construction 
in the state.  The claim that there is a short term-only boost to the state’s 
economy (which they report in as occurring on an annual basis) in the 
amount of $1.7 billion in state GDP and 19,733 total construction related job 
impacts is yet to be demonstrated by reliable research and is highly dubious. 
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Table 3.   
All Construction Jobs in Iowa 
2000 2005 
102,170 114,446 





Conclusion: where does this all leave us? 
 
If any economic developer or state elected official were to announce that 
there has been a systematic gain in the state’s job fortunes of from 4,100 to 
4,700 jobs from 2000 through 2006, most people would have called that a 
great success.  Further, if there were strong rates of capital formation that 
was supporting the state’s construction industries, that also would be met 
with general public approval. 
 
Iowa’s biofuels industry is currently producing good jobs and good job 
impacts across the state.  The industry is still in a growth phase.  There are 
effects that accumulate to the state as a whole, and there are especially 
strong effects in many of our more rural areas that need a boost.  But the 
net gains in state jobs and state product, what we count when we are 
counting our plusses, are much more modest to date than trade associations 
and other supporters claim.   
 
Local and state leaders should be mindful of these differences: they are 
allocating literally hundreds of millions in current and future tax credits and 
other subsidies in support of biofuels development, but they may have a 
distorted sense of potential regional and statewide economic outcomes.   
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